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1 Introduction
In many countries, governments involve special interest groups at very early stages of the po-
litical process, either by hearing their suggestions for the contents of a new policy or even by
granting them decision-making rights in the negotiation about a new policy. The idea of such
an integration of special interests in the legislation stage is to “get everyone in the boat”, i.e.,
to spread the responsibility for a policy reform over all affected groups in order to avoid later
opposition against the implementation of the new policy.1 We show that this early involvement
of interest groups can have adverse consequences: When interest groups take part in the legis-
lation stage, they might later oppose reform implementation more. In these cases, the strategy
to facilitate reform implementation by getting everyone in the boat backfires. The chances of a
successful reform can then be enhanced by excluding special interests from the legislation stage.
It is striking that in many policy areas where governments are publicly criticized far a lack
of reform effort, interest groups are particularly influential. For example, in Germany in the so-
called “Bu¨ndnis fu¨r Arbeit” (alliance for employment) interest groups both from the employers’
and the employees’ sides were invited to negotiate proposals for a reform of parts of the social
security system. At the same time, the German government has been heavily criticized for its
lack of initiative. The advisory board to the German Ministry of Economics and Technology
has warned that the German corporatist system could be causal for this lack of labor market
and health sector reforms.2 The board sees corporatism, broadly defined as the involvement of
non-governmental stakeholders (such as special interest groups) already in the process of the
design of a new policy, as an inefficient shift of political responsibility to special interests. In
the opinion of the board, this can reduce reform efforts of the government in particular when
lobbies have vested interests in preserving the status quo.
These observations raise the question whether the involvement of lobbies at the legislation
stage, rather than providing the cure for government inertia, might be part of the disease. In
this paper, we show why the structure of the political process together with the timing of the
involvement of interest groups can be a cause for a lack of policy reforms. A political decision
is not a one-shot event. We can decompose the political decision-making process in at least
two stages: First, in the legislation or policy choice stage, a new policy for a certain issue is
designed. Then, in the policy implementation stage, the government decides on the effort that it
1Strictly speaking, a reform should be a new policy with far-reaching implications for the economy. Yet, in
this paper, the terms reform and new policy are used interchangeably.
2”Aktuelle Formen des Korporatismus”, Stellungnahme des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesminis-
terium fu¨r Wirtschaft und Technologie, 26. and 27.5.2000 (in German).
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allocates to actually implementing the new policy, e.g., to making a reform work. 3 Our model
uses a stylized two-stage decision-making process with two lobbies. The policy choice stage is
modelled as a modified contest between the two lobbies. In the resulting policy compromise,
the lobbies’ preferred policies are weighted according to their relative efforts in the contest.
Rather than modelling the government’s decision whether to include lobbies or not, we compare
two different scenarios: In one scenario, lobbies are included in the first stage while in the
other, they can lobby only in the second stage. When lobbies are not involved in the policy
choice stage, the government picks its own preferred policy. How much the lobbies support
the implementation of the new policy is determined by the fit of the policy compromise or the
government’s policy to the lobbies’ preferences. The second stage is modelled as a standard
common agency lobbying game about the level of implementation of the new policy. We show
that if lobbies have political influence in both stages of the political process, this can lead to a
lack of implementation compared to the case where lobbies are excluded from the policy choice.
The explanation for our result is not simply that interest groups generally prefer the status
quo. Rather, the result depends on the lobbies’ preferences for the new policy. Think of real
world committee meetings, where the outcome usually reflects the smallest common denominator
of the preferences of all groups involved: Somewhat counter-intuitively, the more weight the
interest groups put on their preferred policy compared to all other alternatives in the first stage,
i.e., the more extreme they are, the less they gain from being involved in the policy negotiations.
The reason is that they have to agree on a compromise. When lobbies share only a small common
denominator, the resulting policy compromise has a low value for them. Then, a strategy of
getting all interest groups in the boat backfires as it reduces the lobbies’ preferences for a policy
change. When, in turn, the lobbies’ utility does not decrease extremely when the policy deviates
from their preferred policy, involving them in the policy choice stage makes them more interested
in later supporting policy implementation than confronting them with a fixed policy chosen by
the government.
There are several reasons why governments involve interest groups in the political process.
One is that the government wants to extract information from the lobbies. Lobbies may be
better informed than the government about the optimality or the feasibility of a policy. How-
ever, they will try to influence the legislation by communicating biased information (see, e.g.,
3While this two-stage structure is a feature of most political processes, it is visible particularly clearly in the
structure of the US House and Senate: A policy is defined in the committees concerned with the issue. Then,
the Committees on Appropriations decide on the fraction of the budget that is made available for the new policy
(see, e.g., Kiewiet and Mc Cubbins, 1991).
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Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999, Baron, 2003, Bennedsen and Feldman, 2001, and Grossman and
Helpman, 2001, Chpt.6). The reason for lobby involvement that is most prominent in the polit-
ical economy literature is the government’s interest in collecting lobbying contributions. This is
usually captured with the by now standard common agency approach of lobbying (Bernheim and
Whinston, 1986a, 1986b, Grossman and Helpman, 1994, 2001, and Dixit, Grossman and Help-
man, 1997).4 The political science literature argues also that governments may involve lobbies
in order to create legitimacy for a policy. Broscheid and Coen (2003), Greenwood (1997), and
Greenwood and Ronit (1994) discuss these reasons of lobby involvement for the EU level. By
making the lobbies responsible for the policy choice, the government may be able to avoid later
opposition of those groups that may loose from the reform. This purpose of lobby involvement
is particularly clear when lobbies are involved in very early stages of the political process.
Few authors analyze the process of policy choice with interest groups. An exception are
Epstein and Nitzan (2002a, 2002b, and 2004). In their models, the policy choice is a contest be-
tween lobbies. Epstein and Nitzan (2002b) model the policy choice as a proposal by a bureaucrat
that has to be approved by an elected decision-maker. Interest groups can influence the approval
decision. Epstein and Nitzan (2004) show that lobbies have the incentive to restrain themselves
in a policy choice contest by suggesting moderate policies in order to increase the chance that
their suggestion is approved. Yet, the authors do not consider the later policy implementation.
Our model makes a step further and asks for the effects of policy compromises in the legislation
stage on lobbying incentives for policy implementation.
Other models endogenize the policy choice by combining a citizen-candidate model with a
model of lobbying: Besley and Coate (2001) find that lobbying does not restrict the equilibrium
policy space as citizens strategically choose candidates whose policy preferences offset the lobbies’
influence. In contrast, Felli and Merlo (2003) find that when the politician can choose the
lobbies he bargains with, the equilibrium policy space is drawn towards the median and lobbying
reduces the set of feasible policy alternatives. Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) endogenize the
effectiveness of lobbying by adding another stage after the standard common agency lobbying
game: If there is political instability, the government may not stay in power long enough to
implement the desired policy. When deciding on their lobbying expenditures, lobbies take the
4Applications of the common agency framework are numerous. See, for example, Persson and Tabellini (1994)
for the provision of local public goods, Rama and Tabellini (1998) for labor market politics, and Lahiri and
Raimondos-Moeller (2000) for foreign aid. Aidt (1998) analyzes environmental politics, Dixit (1996) and Marceau
and Smart (2003) look at taxation issues. Kirchsteiger and Prat (2001) analyze inefficiencies of the lobbying
game. Drazen and Lima˜o (2003) show that it is optimal for the government to commit itself to a cap on transfers
to special interests when both the lobbies and the government have some bargaining power.
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success probability of their political pressure into account. We endogenize the lobbies’ interest
in lobbying in the second stage implementation decision by adding the policy choice stage before
it. In contrast to the standard lobbying models where the lobbies’ objectives are exogenously
given, the success of a new policy depends not only on the influence of its proponents and
opponents in the implementation stage. As the lobbies participate in the policy choice, it is also
determined by their gains from the policy compromise. If an issue is highly contested, lobbies
do not benefit much from a policy compromise. This makes them disinterested in supporting
the implementation of that policy, even if their status-quo bias is relatively low.
There are other explanations for the lack of policy reforms (for surveys see Alesina, 1994,
or Drazen, 1996). Alesina and Drazen (1991) explain delays in budget stabilization measures
with a war of attrition among heterogeneous groups in society. In Fernandez and Rodrik (1991),
uncertainty over gains and losses from a new policy creates a status-quo bias. Romer (2003)
argues that undesired policy outcomes can be the result of citizens’ errors in assessing the value
of a policy. There are very few papers that point to interest groups as the cause for government
inertia. Starting with Olson (1982), they focus on the status-quo bias of lobbies. Coate and
Morris (1999) endogenize the status-quo bias in a dynamic setting. Lobbies first adjust to an
initial policy and then strive to retain the benefits from that policy. In contrast, in our model,
it is not the status-quo bias of lobbies alone that leads to lack of reforms. Rather, we show that
if the lobbies’ participation in the policy choice leads to a weak policy compromise, this reduces
their interest in supporting policy implementation.
We see two main advantages in this two-stage model with interest groups: First, a two-
stage setup helps to draw a more realistic picture of politics. Second, a two-stage model can
highlight structural reasons for the failure of governments to implement new policies. In other
words, the blame does not lie on the preferences of the interest groups alone. Rather, the
political institutions that regulate the involvement of interest groups in the political process
create lobbying incentives that promote government inertia. Persson (1998) points to the strong
link between lobbying outcomes and the political institutions that set the rules for lobbying.
Our model considers one particular case: In the legislation stage, interest groups are integrated
in order to create legitimacy for a policy. In the later policy implementation stage, interest
groups lobby by contributions.
The paper is set up as follows: In section 2, we set up our model of a two-stage political
process. The discussion of the results in section 3 highlights the mechanisms of political decision-
making with interest groups. In section 4, we conclude.
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2 The Two-Stage Political Process
We model a stylized political decision-making process with two stages. The final policy outcome
has two components: The political strategy, i.e., what is done, and the implementation level, i.e.,
how well it is done: The effort or amount of funding that is allocated to the implementation of the
political strategy. For example, the political strategy would be a new law and the implementation
level would then show how well the new law is enforced. The political strategy (in the following:
the policy) is chosen in the first stage. We call this stage the “policy choice stage”.5 In the
second stage, the policy implementation stage, the government decides how much expenditures
or effort it allocates to that policy (in the following: the implementation level).
In the model, there are two interest groups. We assume that the members of these two
groups have managed to overcome the problem of collective action (Olson, 1965) and were able
to organize themselves in lobbies.6 The rest of the population is not organized.7
In the first stage of the model, the lobbies decide on their effort levels for the first-stage policy
choice contest. The policy choice contest determines the compromise policy that is taken as
given in the second stage. There, the government decides on the level of policy implementation.
The interest groups can influence the implementation level by offering contributions to the
government. As the game is solved by backward induction, we begin with the description of the
second stage. The time structure is summarized in figure 1.
Figure 1: Time Structure
First Stage:
policy choice
Second Stage:
policy implementation
Lobbies decide on effort for policy
contest
Policy choice contest determines
final policy compromise
Lobbies decide on lobbying
contributions
Government chooses
policy implementation level
H
t

5It can be thought of as the legislative stage. Yet, the term “legislative stage” would imply a focus on formal
legislative bodies and legislative rules which we do not have in this model.
6Mitra (1999) and Magee (2002) model the endogenous formation of lobbies in the context of trade politics.
7We use this assumption as we want to show how lobbying creates distortions of the policy implementation
level. If all groups of the population were represented in interest groups, the lobbying outcome could be socially
efficient. Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997) show that the equilibrium would be socially efficient if the whole
population is organized in interest groups and if lobbies are constrained to truthful contribution schedules.
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2.1 The Implementation Choice
In the second stage, the new policy is taken as given. We denote it by θ. It is either the outcome
of the contest between the lobbies in stage one or the government’s preferred policy if lobbies are
not involved in the policy choice stage. The interest groups pressure the government to choose
their preferred implementation level for the new policy.
The second stage is a two-period game of common agency, as in Dixit, Grossman, and
Helpman (1997) and Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001): In the first period, the two lobbies
j and k simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose a contribution schedule Ci(X), i ∈ {j, k},
from a set C of feasible schedules. C is assumed such as to guarantee interior solutions in
equilibrium. The contribution schedules are assumed to be continuous and differentiable. They
are a binding promise of a lobby to pay a certain amount of contributions in exchange for each
feasible implementation level.8 In the second period, the government chooses an implementation
level X from a set X of feasible implementation levels, taking into account its own objectives
and the contributions of the two lobbies. The expenditures X for the new policy are a part of
the total tax revenue T of the government. T marks the upper bound for the expenditures for
the new policy. In this section, we first describe the strategies of the interest groups. Then, we
set up the objective function of the government and explain the government’s strategy.
The Lobbies
The lobbies influence the government by contributions. These can range from explicit bribery
to donations to the government party. The contributions are of a private nature. The government
cannot use them to finance policy implementation, to lower taxes, or to give transfers to the
citizens. The utility function of lobby i is given by:
Ui = −Ri − Ci(X) + ui(θ)X + si(T −X) (1)
Ri is the lobby’s effort in the first stage policy choice contest. This effort is sunk after the
first stage and does not play a role for the second-stage lobbying choice. This means that we do
not assume any budget constraints for the lobbies. The trade-off for the lobbies in the policy
implementation game is the following: Both lobbies have to incur the costs of lobbying Ci(X).
The lobbies’ utility from the new policy outcome is taken to be multiplicative in the utility
from the political strategy ui(θ) and the implementation level X. This means that ui(θ) is
equivalent to the marginal interest for expenditures X for policy θ. Out of the remaining tax
8That lobbies are able to commit to their payment schedule is a common feature of all models of lobbying with
common agency. In a dynamic setting, this commitment could be created by reputation effects (Aidt, 1998).
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revenue T − X, other policies are financed. We call these policies the status-quo policies as
they are not the new policy chosen in stage one. The lobbies gain the utility si(T − X) from
these policies. When implementing the new policy, the government diverts resources from other
policies that are also beneficial for the lobbies. This reduces the value of the new policy for the
lobbies. The parameter si ≥ 0 captures the lobbies’ status-quo bias or their opportunity costs
from the new policy. If si is high, the lobby receives high gains from the status-quo policy and
suffers if resources are diverted towards the new policy. Generally, the si do not have to be
symmetric for both interest groups.9
The marginal utility of contributions of lobby j and equivalently for lobby k is given by:
∂Uj
∂Cj
= −1 + ui(θ)∂X({Ci})
∂Cj
− si∂X({Ci})
∂Cj
= −1 + pij ∂X({Ci})
∂Cj
(2)
First, the marginal costs of contributing are 1. The second term of equation 2 shows the
marginal gain for a lobby of the change in X induced by a marginal increase in lobbying con-
tributions. pii = ui(θ)− si denotes the marginal lobbying interest in the implementation of the
policy compromise. When pii < 0, the lobby wants less government effort for that policy as
then, its status-quo bias si outweighs its utility ui from the new policy. When pii > 0, the lobby
strives to increase the policy implementation level. We can see from here that the policy choice
in stage one influences the lobbying incentives in stage two.
The Government
The government chooses the expenditures X for the implementation of the new policy. The
government’s objectives are driven by the desires to be reelected and to appropriate lobbying
contributions. We do not explicitly model elections. Instead, we assume that the government
maximizes its chance of winning the next elections by maximizing the utility of the representative
citizen. This could also be the median voter or the aggregate of all the identical citizens. The
citizens’ utility function is given by:10
W (X) = uG(θ)X + V (T −X) + Y − T (3)
with V (X) continuous and twice differentiable, V (0) = 0, VX < 0 and VXX < 0. To ensure
internal and unique solutions for X, we assume limX→0VX = 0 and limX→TVX = −∞.
The citizens’ utility from the new policy outcome is multiplicative in the utility from the
political strategy uG(θ) and the implementation level X. uG(θ) thus measures the citizens’
9We restrict the si to be positive for the convenience of exposition. Yet, all results would be preserved if we
allowed for negative status-quo biases. Lobbies would then have an exogenous strong interest in the new policy.
10The results of our model hold for a general function W (X) as long as it has a unique global maximum.
However, this more specific function helps to illustrate some of the results.
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marginal interest in the implementation of the new policy θ. The rest of the fixed tax revenue,
T −X, is used for other policies. The citizens’ utility from the expenditures for these policies
is V (T −X). The last part of the citizens’ utility is their private consumption Y − T , where Y
denotes total aggregate income.
When there is no lobbying, the government decides on a level of implementation called the
no-lobby implementation level. It is useful to state the following preliminary result:
Lemma 1 Without lobbying in stage two, the government’s maximization problem has a unique
global maximum X∗nl(θ)∀θ. X∗nl is increasing in uG(θ). It is given by:
X∗nl(θ) = argmaxW (X, θ) = argmax[uG(θ)X + V (T −X) + Y − T ]. (4)
Proof. See the appendix.
When there is lobbying in stage two, the government cares about the political contributions
from the lobbies and about the utility of the citizens. With lobbying, the government maximizes:
G({Ci}i, X) =
∑
i∈{j,k}
Ci(X) +W (X) (5)
Note that our setup differs slightly from Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997) as the utilities
of the lobbies are not included in the objective function of the government. In our model, the
government maximizes a reduced form of the citizens’ welfare. We choose this setup as we want
to assess how the influence of lobbies distorts the policy implementation level away from the
one desired by the public. While our results would still hold qualitatively., the inclusion of the
lobbies’ utilities in the aggregate welfare function would distract attention from this point.
2.2 The Policy Choice
In the first stage, the government has to choose a policy θ. We distinguish the scenario without
lobbying and the corporatist scenario where the interest groups engage in a contest over the
policy choice. Without lobbying, the government chooses the policy θG. It is the most preferred
policy of the representative citizen, i.e., θG = argmax[uG(θ)]. Lobbies remain inactive and take
the policy θG as given in the second stage. In the second scenario, the government invites the
lobbies to take part in the policy choice. We model the policy choice as a contest between the
two lobbies. Each interest group has a preferred policy θi, i ∈ {j, k} in the one-dimensional
policy space, where, without loss of generality, θj < θk. The policy preferences are exogenously
given and fixed, i.e., the proposed policies are not a strategic variable.11 We assume that the
11In contrast, in Epstein and Nitzan (2004), the policy choice is endogenous.
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government’s preferred policy θG lies in between the lobbies’ preferences: θj < θG < θk. This is
plausible as the government represents the general public interest. Note that except for the very
special case where the government’s preference is equal to the mean of the lobbies’ preferences
θG is closer to one lobby’s and farther away from the other lobby’s preferred policy.
Each lobby derives the utility ui(θ) from the policy choice. These utilities are maximized at
the preferred policy of the lobby and minimized at the preferred policy of the other lobby. We
assume that the utilities are symmetric and are strictly decreasing with the distance of θ to the
lobby’s own bliss point θi. For simplicity, we assume that
uj(θj) = uk(θk) = 1;
uj(θk) = uk(θj) = 0, k 6= j.
For each lobby’s utility from the government’s preferred policy, ui(θG) ∈]0; 1[. Note that
uj(θG) 6= uk(θG) depending on which lobby’s interests fit better to the government’s.
What happens in the policy choice stage? The idea behind our model is that the outcome of
the policy choice negotiations reflects the smallest common denominator of preferences. We use
a very simple approach in order to capture this idea: The lobbies are taking part in a modified
version of a Tullock-type rent-seeking contest. Each lobby exerts effort Ri. We do not have
a binding budget constraint for the lobbies and assume that they are always able to cover the
equilibrium first stage and second stage lobbying expenditures. Therefore, the effort costs are
sunk in stage two. Yet, there is a crucial difference to a contest: The final “prize” of the contest
is not the most preferred option of one of the parties, but a weighted average of these preferences.
As weights, we use the probabilities of winning from a standard Tullock (1980) contest success
function that relates each group’s lobbying effort to the total lobbying effort. We use this setup
in order to capture the notion of a policy compromise in which each of the lobbying parties has
to concede partially. This seems to fit better to real world policy negotiations than a standard
contest result where one of the party wins exactly its preferred outcome while the other party
gets nothing. In addition, this setup avoids any time inconsistency problems that might arise
due to the asymmetry between lobbies if one lobby wins while the other looses. We describe
the lobbies’ utility maximizing effort choice and the resulting equilibrium policy compromise in
section 3.2. The compromise policy θC is given by:
θC =
Rk
Rk +Rj
θk +
Rj
Rk +Rj
θj (6)
It is worthwhile to discuss our assumption that whenever lobbies are included in the policy
choice stage the government merely creates a compromise from the preferred policies of the two
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lobbies without taking its own policy preferences into account. Our results would hold if the
government would include its own preferred policy in the compromise. The compromise then
would be θC = bjθj + bkθk + (1 − bk − bj)θG, where bj , bk > 0 and bj + bk < 1 are the weights
that the government puts on the respective policy preferences. We use this assumption for the
clarity of exposition. Yet, it is only important for our result that the government, when lobbies
are taking part in the policy choice stage, gives some weight to the lobbies’ policy preferences.
We also do not give the government the choice of taking only its own policy preference in spite
of having invited the lobbies. This assumption is of course crucial for the results, as otherwise,
the government could always reach its preferred policy θG and the difference between having
or not having lobbies involved in the first stage would vanish. It can be justified by the idea
that before the negotiations take place, the government does not have perfect information on
the exact shape of the lobbies’ policy preferences. When this information is revealed only after
the lobbies have been invited to the policy choice, it is to late for the government to withdraw
its invitation and take its own preferred policy.
3 Lobbying in a Two-Stage Political Process: Equilibrium
In this section we derive the equilibrium of our lobbying game that involves the policy choice
and the policy implementation stage. The equilibrium concept is a subgame-perfect Nash equi-
librium. We solve the model by backward induction.
3.1 Stage Two
The equilibrium implementation level of stage two is part of the equilibrium of the common
agency game. As is common in the literature, we restrict ourselves to “truthful” or “globally
compensating” payment functions. A payment function Ci(X) is truthful if for the fixed utility
level U i we have that Ci(X) = max{piiX + siT − U i, 0}. With truthful payment functions, a
lobby’s willingness to pay for a level of policy implementation is its utility from the equilibrium
implementation level net of this target utility. Generally, the truthful payment function of
principal i rewards the agent for every change in the variable X exactly by the utility change of
the principal, whenever payments are strictly positive.12
12As shown by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the restriction to truthful equilibria is attractive because
they are coalition-proof and efficient in the sense that the outcome of such an equilibrium maximizes the sum
of payoffs of the players. Furthermore, Bernheim and Whinston have shown that each lobby’s best-response
correspondence to any strategy of the opponents contains a truthful strategy. Most models of special interest
politics use the concept of truthful equilibria. Grossman and Helpman (2001) use the term of “compensating
contribution schedules”. They distinguish between locally compensating contribution schedules that define only
10
A truthful equilibrium of our policy implementation game is a pair of feasible optimal and
truthful lobbying contribution schedules {C∗i (X,U i)}i∈{j,k} and the optimal implementation
level X∗ such that X∗ is the government’s best response to {C∗i (X,U i)}i and, for each lobby i,
the equilibrium lobbying contribution C∗i (X∗, U i) and the resulting implementation choice by
the government X∗ are a best response to the contribution schedule of the other lobby.
Proposition 1 For each policy θ and each combination of the lobbies’ status-quo biases {si}i∈{j,k},
there exists an equilibrium {X∗; {C∗i }i} with a unique implementation level X∗ and a set of truth-
ful contribution schedules {C∗i }i if and only if
X∗ = argmaxG({C∗i (X,U i)}i;X) = argmax
 ∑
i∈{j,k}
C∗i +W (X)
 , (7)
C∗i = max{piiX∗ + siT − U i; 0}, (8)
and U i, i ∈ {j, k} such that
G({C∗j (X∗, U j), C∗k(X∗, Uk)};X∗) ≥ max
X∈X
G({C∗j (X,U j)};X). (9)
Proof. See the appendix.
A truthful contribution schedule reflects the lobby’s willingness to pay for a policy change
for all positive lobbying contributions. Formally:
∂Ci
∂X
= −
∂Ui
∂X
∂Ui
∂Ci
(10)
∀X where Ci(X) > 0 given that the lobby reaches the utility level U i, and Ci(X) = 0
otherwise. To induce the lobby to participate in the lobbying game, U i has to be weakly higher
than the utility that the lobby could achieve without participating.13 When the lobbies have
similar interests, the policy implementation level has some characteristics of a public good: There
is no rivalry in consumption as the policy does not entail redistribution among the lobbies. These
mutual gains from policy implementation could induce the lobbies to free-ride on each other’s
lobbying contributions. In common agency models, this is excluded in truthful equilibria where
each lobby contributes its utility increase of a policy change.14
equilibrium behavior and globally compensating contribution schedules that prescribe the same rule also for all
out-of-equilibrium contributions.
13For example, take lobby j with pij > 0: When it does not lobby, Uj = pijX
∗
k + sjT where X
∗
k denotes the
equilibrium policy choice when only k is contributing. If j is to participate in the lobbying game, we need that
at least U j = pijX
∗
k + sjT .
14In contrast to that standard result, Le Breton and Salanie (2003) show that free-riding can occur under
asymmetric information over the politician’s sensitivity to political contributions. Some readers may wonder
whether a situation where lobbies have the same interests is of any relevance. Empirically, Gawande (1997) shows
that the interactions between similar lobbies are the most important source of lobbying expenditures.
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3.2 Stage One
We first consider the case where the lobbies take part in the policy choice stage. Each lobby
chooses its effort Ri for the policy choice contest by maximizing its utility with respect to Ri,
taking into account how the game in stage two will be affected by this decision. Lobby i’s
problem is:
max
Ri
Ui = max
Ri
[−Ri − C∗i (X∗) + ui(θC)X∗ + si(T −X∗)] (11)
where the compromise policy θC is given by θC = RkRk+Rj θk +
Rj
Rk+Rj
θj .
For our purposes, we are interested in the effort levels Ri only insofar as they determine the
compromise policy. As we will later only compare the resulting policy implementation levels X∗
and the citizens’ welfare, we do not need the equilibrium value of the lobbies’ utility function.
Note that X∗ implicitly depends on the effort choice Ri. The reason is that the compromise
policy determines the lobbies utility from the policy choice stage ui(θC) which in turn determines
the equilibrium lobbying effort C∗i (X∗). Via the truthful equilibrium in stage two, we have that
X∗ = X∗(
∑
i∈{j,k} pii(θC)) where pii = ui(θC)− si. We can show that we have a unique outcome
of the policy choice stage where lobbies are involved:
Proposition 2 The compromise policy θC is given by θC =
θj+θk
2 .
Proof. See the appendix.
For the above result, it suffices to show that the two lobbies behave symmetrically in the
first-stage equilibrium. Intuitively, the reason is that lobbies use truthful contribution schedules
in stage two, meaning that their marginal contributions reflect the changes in their marginal
utility due to a policy change. Thus, changes in the marginal utility from the implementation of
the new policy, ui(θ) are exactly compensated (see proof of proposition 2). Also, as there is no
budget constraint for the lobbies, so first stage lobbying effort has no impact on the availability
of second stage lobbying contributions.
We define the utility level of the lobbies from the policy compromise by uj(θC) = uk(θC) = λ.
Note that we assumed that the lobbies’ preferences are symmetric. As the compromise policy
is the mean of the lobbies’ bliss points, they derive the same utility from the compromise. Yet,
we did not restrict the shape of the preferences: They can be very extreme, putting a utility
of 1 only on the own preferred policy and of nearly 0 on all other policies, they can be very
moderate, putting a utility of 0 only on the opponent’s proposal and of almost 1 on all in-
between policies. The utility λ that the interest groups derive from the policy compromise,
captures some characteristics of the lobbies’ preferences and of the policy issue that is at stake.
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A small λ means that for this issue, preferences are very extreme. A a compromise therefore
yields a low value for the lobbying parties. A high λ implies that the issue is less controversial
so that lobbies can benefit to some extent from the compromise. We can make the following
categorization:
Lemma 2 The lobbies’ utilities from the policy compromise ui(θC) = λ measure the extremeness
of their policy preferences. We can distinguish the following two cases:
• Case 1: when λ > 12 , θC maximizes the lobbies’ joint policy preferences
∑
i ui(θ)
• Case 2: when λ < 12 , θC minimizes the lobbies’ joint policy preferences
∑
i ui(θ).
Proof. We know that ui(θ) is increasing towards each lobby’s bliss point and that uj and uk
are symmetric. As θC is the mean of the lobbies’ bliss points, λ can be used as a measure of the
curvature of the lobbies’ utilities from the policy choice. λ > 12 holds when both utility functions
are concave. Then, the mean policy θC maximizes the sum of utility values. λ < 12 holds when
both utility functions are convex. Then, the sum of the utility values is minimal at θC .
In the other case, when the lobbies are excluded from the first stage, the government chooses
its preferred policy θG. Then, lobbies gain ui(θG) from the policy choice stage.
3.3 Lobbying as Cause of Government Inertia?
We can now compare the overall outcomes for the case where lobbies are involved in the first
stage and the case where they are excluded. This tells us under which conditions it may backfire
to get everyone in the boat from the beginning. From propositions 1 and 2, we get:
Proposition 3 When lobbies are involved in both stages of the political process, we get a unique
equilibrium of the political decision-making game with a compromise policy θC , the policy imple-
mentation level X∗, and a set of truthful lobbying contribution schedules {C∗i (X∗, U i)}i∈{j,k}.
Proof. The proof follows from propositions 1 and 2.
The purpose of this model is to point to the link between the two stages of a political
decision-making process. The process of choosing a policy on the one hand and the decision
on a level of policy implementation on the other hand are connected: The quality of a policy
compromise and the gains that lobbies derive from this compromise directly affect the level of
implementation of a policy. In addition, the status-quo biases of the lobbies play an important
role. In particular for policy compromises that have a low value for lobbies, their preferences
for the status-quo policies may outweigh the positive interests in the new policy.
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In this section, we compare the implementation outcomes for different situations: We dis-
tinguish the cases with lobbying in both stages, the case where lobbies are only involved in the
policy implementation decision but not in the policy choice stage, and the case without any
lobbying. We can show that for a wide range of policy characteristics, the inclusion of lobbies
in the political process leads to a reduced level of policy implementation. We use two measures
for our comparison. The first is the policy implementation level X. A higher X means that
a policy is implemented to a higher degree, i.e., the reform is more encompassing. Then, in
order to assess the impact of lobby involvement, we also use a comparison of the welfare of our
representative citizen under the different scenarios.
We first compare the policy implementation outcomes for the case where lobbies are involved
in both stages and the case where lobbies are excluded from the first stage. For notation, let
X∗C be the implementation level following from the marginal gains from policy implementation
piCi = λ− si when lobbies are involved in the first-stage lobbying process and the policy choice
is the compromise policy θC . As mentioned in section 2.2, the lobbying efforts in stage one are
sunk. Thus, when deciding on their lobbying effort in stage two, the lobbies only consider their
gains ui(θC) = λ from the policy compromise in stage one, and their status quo biases si. Let
X∗G be the implementation level following from the case where lobbies are only involved in the
second stage of the political process. Then, the policy that is brought to implementation is the
government’s preferred policy θG and the lobbies’ marginal gains from policy implementation
are piGi = ui(θG)− si. Using our previous findings, we can state:
Proposition 4 The inclusion of lobbies in the first stage of the political process leads to reduced
levels of policy implementation with respect to the case where lobbies are involved only in the sec-
ond stage of the political process when the lobbies’ policy preferences ui(θ) are convex. Formally,
X∗C < X
∗
G, if λ <
1
2 .
Proof. See the appendix.
For this comparison, the status-quo biases of the lobbies cancel out as lobbies are subject
to the bias in both cases. The equilibrium implementation level depends only on the sum of
marginal interest in the new policy
∑
i ui(θ). Generally, the two cases will differ as we have
that θC =
θj+θk
2 and θj < θG < θk. We do not look more closely at the knife-edge case where
θC = θG. The sum of lobbies’ utilities
∑
i ui(θ) from the first stage policy choice is minimized at
θC whenever ui is strictly convex. This is the case when λ < 12 . Similarly,
∑
i ui(θ) is maximized
whenever ui is strictly concave and therefore, when λ > 12 (see lemma 2). The result says in
essence that whenever the lobbies’ utilities from the policy choice are convex, the lobbies would
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be more interested in the implementation of the new policy if they were confronted with a policy
chosen by the government. In this case, for the aggregate of the two lobbies, the compromise θC
that is created when the lobbies are involved in the policy choice stage minimizes their interest
in policy implementation. Any other suggestion from the government can in this case do better
than that. When, on the other hand, the lobbies place a higher utility on a potential policy
compromise, i.e., λ ≥ 12 , they gain from being invited in the policy choice stage. In these cases,
having lobbying in both stages of the political process will improve the implementation outcome.
The result is illustrated graphically in figure 2 (figure 2 about here).
Our result identifies general conditions under which involving lobbies too early in the political
process creates the problem of a lack of policy implementation. Then, interest groups should be
excluded from lobbying in the first stage and should be forced to accept the policy chosen by the
government. Policy implementation can under these conditions be improved if the government
does not try to get everyone in the boat to create a compromise but accepts later potential
opposition to a policy reform from one of the lobbies. To have one strong supporter of a policy
and one opposer of a reform might be preferable to having two lukewarm defenders.
When we compare the outcomes with lobbying with the outcome without any lobbying, the
status quo biases of the lobbies play a role. We can replicate here the standard result that the
status quo bias of lobbies contributes to a lack of policy reforms. For notation, let X∗nl denote
the policy implementation level for the case without lobbies.
Proposition 5 The inclusion of lobbies in both stages of the political process leads to reduced
levels of policy implementation with respect to the case without lobbying, i.e., X∗C < X
∗
nl if∑
i∈{j,k} piCi < 0. This is true in the following cases:
• Case 1: when ∑i si > 2, X∗C < X∗nl ∀λ ∈ [0; 1]
• Case 2: when 0 <∑i si ≤ 2, the result depends on λ:
– For λ <
∑
i
si
2 , X
∗
C < X
∗
nl
– For λ ≥
∑
i
si
2 , X
∗
C ≥ X∗nl
Proof. See the appendix.
Whether the implementation levelX∗C is larger or smaller than the no-lobby levelX
∗
nl depends
on the relation of the status-quo biases si and the lobbies’ utilities λ from the policy compromise.
The higher si, the lower is a lobby’s marginal interest piCi in the implementation of the new policy.
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Vice versa, for a given status-quo bias, the marginal gains pii for a lobby from the new policy
increase with λ. Each lobby k suffers from the new policy and will lobby to reduce its level of
implementation whenever pii < 0. This is in line with the observation that policies that reduce
existing advantages for certain groups encounter more difficulties in implementation. In total,
lobbying leads to a reduced level of implementation of the new policy already when
∑
i pi
C
i < 0.
An equivalent argument holds for the comparison of the case where lobbies are only active
in the second stage to the case without lobbying.
Proposition 6 The inclusion of lobbies in the second stage of the political process leads to
reduced levels of policy implementation with respect to the case without lobbying, i.e., X∗G < X
∗
nl
if and only if
∑
i∈{j,k} piGi ≤ 0. This is true in the following cases:
• Case 1: when ∑i si > 2, X∗G < X∗nl ∀λ ∈ [0; 1]
• Case 2: when 0 <∑i si ≤ 2, the result depends on ∑i ui(θG):
– For
∑
i ui(θG) <
∑
i si, X
∗
G < X
∗
nl
– For
∑
i ui(θG) ≥
∑
i si, X
∗
G ≥ X∗nl
Proof. See the appendix.
Whenever the aggregate status-quo bias of the lobbies outweighs the sum of their utilities
from the new policy, lobbying induces the government to reduce the policy implementation level.
The results of propositions 5 and 6 show the relation of the status-quo bias to the possibility
of reaching substantial agreements on a political strategy. Consider first the case where lobbies
are involved in both stages. When the lobbies’ utility functions from the policy are convex,
i.e., when λ < 12 , we have that X
∗
C < X
∗
nl in more cases as λ <
∑
i
si
2 can be fulfilled for lower
status quo biases. Thus, in particular when the policy compromise is weak, the status quo bias
determines the result and it is more likely that interest groups lobby for a low implementation
of the new policy. On the other hand, in the case where lobbies are involved only in the second
stage, they are more likely to oppose the new policy when their utilities are concave. Then, 2λ
is the maximum of
∑
i ui(θ). For all government policy choices θG 6= θC ,
∑
i ui(θG) will be lower
than that. The condition
∑
i ui(θG) <
∑
i si can then be fulfilled with lower status-quo biases.
Note that this brings us back to our main result in proposition 4: Lobbying is more detrimental
in both stages if the lobbies’ utilities are convex and more detrimental in the second stage only
if they are concave.
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Another benchmark for the success of policy reforms rather than the policy implementation
level X is the utility W (X) of the citizens from a reform, i.e., both from the policy choice θ and
the level of implementation X. Using this benchmark, we get the following result:
Proposition 7 Lobbying always reduces the equilibrium citizens’ utility W (θ,X∗) with respect
to the case without lobbying.
When we compare the case with lobbying in both stages to the case with lobbying only in the
second stage, we get that for W (θC , X∗C) < W (θG, X
∗
G) it is sufficient that
∑
i pi
G
i < 0 and λ <
1
2
or that
∑
i pi
G
i > 0 and λ >
1
2 .
Proof. See the appendix.
We know that without lobbying W (X) is maximized when the government chooses θG and
X∗nl(θG) accordingly as this reflects the preferences of the citizens. When lobbies are only
involved in the second stage of the political process, the policy choice remains at θG. Then, the
second stage lobbying contributions reduce the utility of the citizens: As the lobbies compensate
the government for any shifts in the implementation level away from X∗nl(θG) and the according
losses in the citizen’s utility W (X), the government distorts the implementation level away from
their preferred level X∗nl(θG). Regardless of whether
∑
pii > 0 or
∑
pii < 0, the inefficiently
high or low implementation level will always reduce the citizens’ utility with respect to the case
without lobbying.
When lobbies are active also in the first stage of the political process, we have an additional
distortion as the first-stage policy compromise shifts the policy choice to θC , away from the
citizens’ preferred policy θG. Whether these two distortions reduce the citizens’ equilibrium
welfare level more than only the shift in the implementation level, i.e., whether lobbying in both
stages is worse for the citizens than lobbying only in the second stage, depends on the lobbying
impact on the implementation level. When lobbying in both stages distorts the implementation
level more and also distorts the policy choice, this for sure is worse for the citizens. The
proposition 7 states exactly that. For the case where the lobbies when lobbying in both stages
have a less distortive impact on the policy implementation level, we cannot derive clear-cut
results: Two smaller distortions could still reduce utility less than a larger one.
For two different benchmarks, we have shown that the inclusion of lobbies in the policy choice
stage and in the policy implementation stage can have negative consequences: First, lobbying in
the policy choice stage can reduce the policy implementation level and thus the extent to which
a reform is actually implemented. Second, when we use the benchmark of the citizens’ utility,
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we can prove a similar result, albeit not for the same range of parameters: If the government
would choose whether or not to include lobbies in the policy choice stage on the basis of the
welfare of citizens, it could allow lobbies in both stages when
∑
i pi
G
i > 0 and λ <
1
2 . Yet, for
these parameter values, lobbying in the first stage lowers policy implementation efforts. The
lack of reforms then is in the interest of the citizens. In this paper, we do not look at the choice
of the government of whether or not to invite lobbies to the policy choice. Rather, the aim is to
point out that there exist conditions under which the strategy to always involve interest groups
early on in the political decision-making process can be a cause of, rather than a cure for, the
lack of actually implemented policy reforms.
4 Conclusion and Policy Implications
We model the process of the choice and implementation of a policy with lobbying. When interest
groups are involved in both stages of the political process, they have significant influence on
the policy implementation outcome. It is then crucial whether the lobbies value the policy
compromise or not. We have identified conditions under which the inclusion of lobbies in the
first stage of the political process can lead to a lack of reforms. These conditions depend on the
extremeness of the lobbies’ policy preferences. The more extreme lobbies are, the less they value
a compromise that is reached in the policy choice stage. If the compromise is weak from the
point of view of the lobbies, they are more likely to oppose the implementation of the new policy.
In these cases, the strategy of governments to get everyone in the boat in order to curb later
opposition to the implementation of a policy can easily backfire. It would then be beneficial to
exclude interest groups from the first stage of the decision-making process. This partial ban on
corporatism would mean that the government alone designs the policy and lobbies are involved
only in the decision on policy implementation. In this respect, the result of this paper calls for
more transparency in the legislation process and a clearer responsibility of the government for
policy choices.
From our model, we see that one way to overcome the problem could be to increase the
lobbies’ utility from the government’s compromise policy. This amounts to creating greater
scope for compromise in the relevant policy area. Public discussion of an issue as well as the
dissemination of objective information about it, for example, by publications by independent
experts, could achieve such a change in perception. Here, the independent media could play
an important role. Another problem are the lobbies’ status-quo biases: Especially when the
former policy has been very advantageous for them, they will not be in favor of the transfer
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of government resources to a new policy. When the government is dependent on the lobbies’
support for the implementation of a new policy, it could try to reduce their stakes in the old
policy, for example, by creating disadvantages for groups that are opposed to change.
We have derived a result with strong policy implications: Interest groups should not be
involved in the early stages of the political process where policies are defined. We have also
shown that higher implementation outcomes can be achieved when lobbies are totally excluded
from the political process. Yet, there is a caveat. To demand the exclusion of special interest
groups from the political process seems too radical for at least the two following reasons: First,
politics today are to a large extent determined by special interest groups. In almost all countries,
we find large numbers of organized lobbies. Their official exclusion from the political process
could lead them to use inofficial channels of influence, such as bribes. This would make the
political process less transparent. Transparency can only be achieved by officially acknowledging
interest groups as important political agents. Second, lobbies play other roles in the political
process that we have not acknowledged in this model. An important function is that they provide
information to political decision-makers. Even though lobbies have incentives to communicate
biased information, lobbying can improve the allocation of information in the political decision-
making process.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The utility function of the citizens for any given policy choice θ is defined by:
W (X) = uG(θ)X + V (T −X) + Y − T
The first-order condition for a maximum is:
∂W
∂X
= uG(θ) +
∂V (T −X)
∂(T −X)
∂(T −X)
∂X
= 0
With ∂(T−X)∂X = −1 and ∂V (T−X)∂(T−X) = −∂V (T−X)∂X , we get that:
−∂V (T −X)
∂X
= uG(θ)
With V (0) = 0, VX < 0 and VXX < 0, and limX→0VX = 0 and limX→TVX = −∞, this
condition is fulfilled by a unique X∗ for each parameter constellation.
We can also see directly from the first order condition that the maximum X∗ is increasing
in uG(θ).
For a global maximum, the second order condition is:
∂2W
(∂X)2
=
∂2V (T −X)
(∂X)2
< 0
This is fulfilled ∀X by the assumption VXX < 0.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof for the existence and uniqueness of the second-stage equilibrium ({C∗i }i;X∗) follows
the standard proof in the literature (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 2001, Chpt. 8). The proof
evolves in several steps. Consider first the lobbies’ problem. When the lobbies are constrained
to use truthful contribution schedules, the marginal change of their contribution Ci(X) with
respect to a change in X has to reflect their marginal change in utility:
∂Ci
∂X
= −
∂Ui
∂X
∂Ui
∂Ck
= − pii−1 = pii
For pii > 0, contributions grow with a higher level of policy implementation. When pii < 0, the
lobby would like to see less policy implementation. Contributions increase with a lower X.
Using these truthful contribution schedules, it can be shown that the government’s objective
function G({Ci(X)}i, X) has a global maximum for each parameter constellation and marginal
20
lobbying interests pii. The first-order condition for the government is given by:
∂G
∂X
=
∑
i
∂Ci
∂X
+
∂W (X)
∂X
= 0.
We can substitute the marginal lobbying contributions:
∂W (X)
∂X
= −
(∑
i
pii
)
With Lemma 1, W (X) has a unique global maximum when there is no lobbying in the imple-
mentation stage. Call that equilibrium X∗nl(θ). For any given θ, W (X) is increasing for all
X < X∗nl(θ) and decreasing for all X > X
∗
nl(θ).
With lobbying contributions, the first-order condition for the government is changed: For∑
i pii > 0,
∂W
∂X has to be negative in equilibrium.
∂W
∂X is monotonously decreasing in X for
X > X∗nl for a given θ (see Lemma 1). Therefore, it must hold that the new equilibrium is
unique and that X∗ > X∗nl. Also, when
∑
i pii < 0, we must have that X
∗ < X∗nl. Generally, for
a given θ the equilibrium implementation level increases with
∑
i pii.
For our aim of comparing the equilibrium implementation levels, it suffices to show that
the equilibrium yields unique implementation levels. For this, we have used that with truthful
contribution schedules, the marginal lobbying contributions are uniquely defined. This follows
from stage one of our game. For the results of our model, we do not need the exact values of the
government’s utility and the lobbies’ equilibrium contributions. For the sake of completeness, we
show how to pin down the equilibrium lobbying contributions, given that the lobbies participate
in the second-stage lobbying game. Condition 9 states that each lobby has to contribute so
much that the government is at least as well off when all lobbies contribute as when one of the
lobbies does not contribute. From this, together with condition 8, we get the conditions for the
lobbies’ equilibrium utilities U i and their equilibrium lobbying contributions C∗i . Condition 9
of proposition 1 is:
G({C∗j (X∗, U j), C∗k(X∗, Uk)};X∗) ≥ max
X∈X
G({C∗j (X,U j)};X)
The first-order condition for the government’s problem with one lobby is:
∂W (X)
∂X
= −pij
Following the argument made above, we get a unique policy implementation level X∗j for the case
where only one lobby is active and contributes C∗j (X∗j , U j). This also gives us the government
payoff for this case, given the lobbying contribution by lobby j, i.e.:
G∗j = G({C∗j (X∗j , U j);X∗}) =W (X∗j ) + C∗j (X∗j , U j)
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Each lobby has to give the government at least that payoff G∗j , j 6= k. In equilibrium, condition 9
has to be binding. From this, we get two equations with the equilibrium contribution schedules:
∑
i
C∗i +W (X
∗) = C∗j (X
∗
j ) +W (X
∗
j )
and similarly for lobby k. The set of equilibrium lobbying contributions is constrained by the
requirement of truthful equilibria where each lobby has to get at least the fixed utility level U i.
Condition 8 requires that the contribution schedules fulfill:
C∗i = max{piiX∗ + siT − U i, 0}
Using these two conditions together gives us U j and C∗j and symmetrically Uk and C∗k :
U j =W (X∗)−W (X∗k) + pijX∗ + sjT + pik(X∗ −X∗k)
and:
C∗j =W (X
∗
k)−W (X∗)− pik(X∗ −X∗k)
With the help of condition 9, it can be shown that the lobbies contribute a positive amount in
equilibrium, i.e., C∗i > 0 (see also Grossman and Helpman, 1994, pp. 845). If the lobbies are to
participate in the second stage, we need that U j is at least as much as what lobby j would get
if it did not lobby. This gives us the participation condition for lobby j:
U j =W (X∗)−W (X∗k) + pijX∗ + sjT + pik(X∗ −X∗k) ≥ pijX∗k + sjT
or:
W (X∗)−W (X∗k) + (pij + pik)(X∗ −X∗k) ≥ 0
and symmetrically for lobby k. The loss of the citizens’ welfare due to lobbying also of lobby j
has to be small enough to be compensated by the lobbies’ payments.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 2
When choosing the equilibrium effort level Ri, the two lobbies simultaneously maximize
Ui = −Ri − C∗i (X∗) + ui(θC)X∗ + si(T −X∗)
where
θC =
Rk
Rk +Rj
θk +
Rj
Rk +Rj
θj
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We have that X∗ implicitly depends on the effort choice Ri as Ri determines θC and∑
i∈{j,k} ui(θC) together with the si in turn determines X∗ (see proposition 1). Thus, the
first-order condition for lobby i’s maximization problem is:
∂Ui
∂Ri
= −1− ∂C
∗
i (X
∗)
∂X∗
∂X∗
∂
∑
ui(θC)
∂
∑
ui(θC)
∂θC
∂θC
∂Ri
+
∂
∑
ui(θC)
∂θC
∂θC
∂Ri
X∗ + (ui(θC)− si) ∂X
∗
∂
∑
ui(θC)
∂
∑
ui(θC)
∂θC
∂θC
∂Ri
= 0
where X∗ = X∗(
∑
i∈{j,k} pii) = X∗(
∑
i∈{j,k}[ui(θC)− si]).
As in a truthful equilibrium, the lobbies have truthful contribution schedules, we can sub-
stitute ∂C
∗
i (X
∗)
∂X∗ by pii = ui(θC)− si (see proposition 1). Then, the first-order condition reduces
to:
∂Ui
∂Ri
= −1 + ∂
∑
ui(θC)
∂θC
∂θC
∂Ri
X∗ = 0
and finally
∂
∑
ui(θC)
∂θC
∂θC
∂Ri
=
1
X∗
As X∗ = X∗(
∑
i∈{j,k} pii) = X∗(
∑
i∈{j,k}[ui(θC)− si]), the first-order conditions are symmet-
ric for the two lobbies. They will thus in equilibrium choose the same first-stage effort levels:
R∗j = R∗k. This immediately determines θC =
θj+θk
2 .
5.4 Proof of Proposition 4
From proposition 1, we have the first order condition for the government when lobbies are active
in both stages of the political process given as:
uG(θC)− ∂V (T −X)
∂X
= −
∑
i
piCi
Similarly, the first order condition for the government when lobbies are only active in the second
stage is:
uG(θG)− ∂V (T −X)
∂X
= −
∑
i
piGi
With respect to proposition 1, we now have two parameters to consider, namely uG(θ) and pii.
Both change when θC is replaced with θG.
First, in lemma 1, we have seen that without lobbying, the implementation level X∗ that
maximizes the citizens’ welfare function is increasing in uG(θ). By assumption, uG(θ) is max-
imized for θG. Therefore, for
∑
i pi
C
i =
∑
i pi
G
i we have that X
∗
C < X
∗
G. We also know from
proposition 1 that the equilibrium implementation level X∗ is increasing in
∑
i pii. Thus, if we
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now find under which conditions
∑
i pi
C
i <
∑
i pi
G
i , we have identified a sufficient condition for
X∗C < X
∗
G. We can write∑
i
piCi <
∑
i
piGi ⇔
∑
i
ui(θC)−
∑
i
si <
∑
i
ui(θG)−
∑
i
si
This reduces to:
2ui(θC) <
∑
i
ui(θG)
where ui(θC) = λ. Consider now our result in lemma 2. From there, we have that when λ < 12 ,
θC minimizes the lobbies’ joint policy preferences (Case 2). This means that for λ < 12 ,
∑
i ui(θG)
must be larger than
∑
i ui(θC) ∀θG 6= θC . Then, we have that
∑
i pi
C
i <
∑
i pi
G
i and X
∗
C < X
∗
G.
5.5 Proof of Proposition 5
To prove thatX∗C < X
∗
nl if
∑
i∈{j,k} piCi < 0 is similar to the proof in proposition 4: The first-order
condition for the status-quo level of policy implementation X∗nl is:
uG(θG)− ∂V (T −X)
∂X
= 0
Similarly, the first order condition for the government when lobbies are active in both stages is:
uG(θC)− ∂V (T −X)
∂X
= −
∑
i
piCi
Again, we know from lemma 1 that without lobbying, the implementation level X∗ that maxi-
mizes the citizens’ welfare function is increasing in uG(θ). By assumption, uG(θ) is maximized
for θG. We also know from proposition 1 that the equilibrium implementation level X∗ is in-
creasing in
∑
i pii. Thus, if we now find under which conditions
∑
i pi
C
i < 0, we have identified a
sufficient condition for X∗C < X
∗
nl.
We can write ∑
i
piCi < 0⇔
∑
i
ui(θC)−
∑
i
si < 0⇔ 2λ <
∑
i
si
We can write this as λ <
∑
i
si
2 and have our condition for X
∗
C < X
∗
nl for the case where
0 <
∑
i si ≤ 2. Note that 2λ can never be larger than 2. This means that for
∑
i si > 2, we
always have that
∑
i pi
C
i < 0.
5.6 Proof of Proposition 6
To show that X∗C < X
∗
nl if
∑
i∈{j,k} piCi < 0 is similar to the proof in proposition 4: The first-order
condition for the status-quo level of policy implementation X∗nl is:
uG(θG)− ∂V (T −X)
∂X
= 0
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Similarly, the first order condition for the government when lobbies are active only in the second
stage of the political process is:
uG(θG)− ∂V (T −X)
∂X
= −
∑
i
piGi
Here, we do not have to care about the changes in the citizens’ welfare function as we always
have the policy θG. Thus, the condition that
∑
i pi
G
i < 0 is both necessary and sufficient for
X∗G < X
∗
nl.
We can write ∑
i
piGi < 0⇔
∑
i
ui(θG)−
∑
i
si < 0
Also here,
∑
i ui(θG) can never be larger than 2. This means that for
∑
i si > 2, we always have
that
∑
i pi
G
i < 0.
5.7 Proof of Proposition 7
For the proof, consider the citizens’ welfare function:
W (X) = uG(θ)X − V (T −X) + Y − T.
The first part of the proof is straightforward: When there is lobbying only in the second stage,
we have θ = θG, where θG maximizes uG(θ). Then, W (X) is only distorted as the lobbying
contributions
∑
pi distort the implementation outcome X∗. When there is lobbying in both
stages, the policy choice θC also reduces uG(θ).
To prove that W (X∗C , θC) < W (X
∗
G, θG) when λ <
1
2 , take the result from proposition 4:
When λ < 12 , we have that
∑
i pi
C
i <
∑
i pi
G
i . When we now add the requirement that∑
i pi
G
i < 0, we see that lobbying distorts the policy implementation levels downwards. In this
case, as
∑
i pi
C
i <
∑
i pi
G
i , we have that X
∗
C < X
∗
G and thus that X
∗
nl−X∗C > X∗nl−X∗G. Therefore,
lobbying in both stages both distorts uG(θ) and X∗ more than lobbying only in the second stage.
Thus, it must be the case that W (X∗C , θC) < W (X
∗
G, θG).
On the other hand, when λ > 12 , we have that
∑
i pi
C
i >
∑
i pi
G
i . When we now add the
requirement that
∑
i pi
G
i > 0, we see that lobbying distorts the policy implementation levels
upwards. In this case, as
∑
i pi
C
i >
∑
i pi
G
i , we have that X
∗
C > X
∗
G and thus that X
∗
C −X∗nl >
X∗G −X∗nl. Therefore, lobbying in both stages both distorts uG(θ) and X∗ more than lobbying
only in the second stage. Thus, it must be the case that W (X∗C , θC) < W (X
∗
G, θG).
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Figure 2:  Comparing lobbying in both stages with lobbying in 
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